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1. Introduction 
The European Union suffers from not only a 
democratic but also a communication deficit. In 
the same way as both problems are intertwined, 
so are the symptoms. The last elections to the 
European Parliament suffered from a record low 
turnout and the election campaigns were run 
mainly on themes relating to domestic politics, 
resembling small plebiscites on the 
government’s performance at the national level 
(Kurpas et al., 2004). Only Eurosceptic parties 
made strong gains, advocating the withdrawal of 
their countries or strong downgrading of the 
EU’s competences. These results highlighted 
two painful realities. First, they re-confirmed the 
trend since the first EP elections in 1979 that 
citizens increasingly see less reason to vote in 
elections that do not give them ‘a real choice’ 
such as voting for the Commission president or 
to express their socio-economic preferences by 
voting for a party that can deliver on these 
preferences if it comes to power. Second, voter 
apathy indicates that the importance of decisions 
at the Community level, along with the role of 
the European Parliament and its impact on 
national policy, is not yet established among 
citizens. Some of the reasons for this failure are 
structural, such as the lack of a strong European 
identity; some are legal or institutional and thus 
hard to change. For instance, as long as the parties 
represented in European Parliament do not 
emancipate themselves from their national 
counterparts and manage to run an election 
campaign with candidates for the Commission  
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presidency, campaign dynamics and voter turn-out are not 
likely to change. 
At the same time, democracy is not a mechanical process of 
aggregating preferences and determining majority opinion. 
We argue that one important problem is that citizens lack 
the knowledge to form an opinion about how their views 
could be advanced through the EU. Moreover, in the battle 
for public opinion, pro-EU voices have often been too weak 
in the past to make an impact and convince citizens that 
European integration increases, not diminishes their 
autonomy to govern their lives in a global context. If this 
situation continues, national governments will find it more 
difficult to convince their citizens to ratify the 
Constitutional Treaty and to constructively engage in EU 
governance. If the Constitutional Treaty is rejected in more 
than a few member states, it may either need to be re-
negotiated or will be delayed until later referenda deliver 
the ‘desired’ result. Yet this state of limbo and fudge is 
neither good for democracy nor for the EU’s ability to 
provide solutions to common problems. The deficits of EU 
communication and democracy will be manifested as much 
at the member state level as in Brussels. 
Some indications of a communication deficit 
What are the symptoms of the communication deficit? 
Public opinion surveys, not least the Eurobarometer series 
but also qualitative studies based on focus groups indicate  
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that a majority of citizens lack basic knowledge about how 
the EU works, the issues being decided and how these 
influence their daily lives. While citizens’ self-perception 
of being informed has improved substantially over the last 
few years, about a quarter of the population feels that the 
mass media, despite being the most important source of 
information in this area, provide too little coverage of EU 
affairs (European Commission, 2002b, pp. 86-99). While 
this figure may not be very high, studies have also used 
knowledge-related questions to show that the citizens’ 
awareness of commissioners, decision-making procedures 
and institutional competences is still very low. Around 25% 
of EU citizens believe, for instance, that most of the EU 
budget is spent on administration and personnel. 
Qualitative surveys of focus groups have demonstrated that 
few citizens were able to specify the responsibilities of the 
Commission and the Parliament in the most general terms, 
excluding the substantial proportion of those who were not 
able to name these institutions in the first place. About a 
third of the respondents have never heard of the Council of 
Ministers and those who did saw it mostly as an institution 
where national politicians meet for consultations, not for 
negotiation and decision-making (OPTEM, 2001, p. 2). To 
be sure, few German citizens can say what the Bundesrat 
does or what role their second vote plays in federal 
elections. Nevertheless, the fact that EU citizens are to a 
large extent unaware of the existence, not to mention the 
competences of the EU’s key decision-making body is a 
clear verdict on the public communication of EU 
governance. 
While it is hard to objectively define the influence of EU 
decisions on citizens lives, it is fair to say that EU decisions 
and proposals have had an impact on various areas of 
public life, although less direct than taxation, but 
nevertheless so important as to merit close public scrutiny 
and involvement. What is worrying in this context is the 
large gap between the levels of knowledge and interest 
among the higher and lower socio-economic groups (EOS 
Gallup, 1996 and Gallup Organization Hungary, 2003). 
That such a gap exists was to be expected. Yet the breadth 
of the gap between what could be considered elite groups 
(business, media, culture, the political sphere and 
administration) and others is still astonishing and 
strengthens the hypothesis that the level of interest has less 
to do with the ‘objective importance’ of the EU than with 
the problems of how to communicate the relevance and 
functioning of multi-level governance to the majority of EU 
citizens – who do not read specialist publications or have 
sufficient access to new communication tools. What would 
be needed is more debate across national publics in order to 
foster mutual understanding and an EU civic awareness as 
well as a Europeanisation of national debates in order to 
facilitate opinion-formation about how national 
representatives engage in EU governance. At the moment 
we only have a geographically and socially restricted public 
sphere centred on the geographical space of Brussels. It 
revolves around particular elites who read similar 
publications and engage in transnational debates frequently 
enough to call it cohesive. In addition, national and regional 
public spheres have been subject to some moderate vertical 
Europeanisation process, which means that they pay more 
attention to EU issues than they used to, but not yet with 
sufficient continuity, depth or differentiation. We have seen 
relatively little horizontal Europeanisation of national and 
regional public spheres, meaning that genuine transnational 
debates and communicative exchanges across national 
borders are still very limited.  
What can be done now? 
It is high time that EU institutions and particularly national 
actors took the communication deficit seriously and started 
to tackle it in a sustained and active manner. Furthermore, 
academic institutions, which predominantly have the tasks 
to educate, produce reliable research and generate new 
ideas and debate, need to involve themselves in a proactive 
manner. Finally, media organisations and journalists have a 
responsibility to adapt their coverage in order to provide 
their audience with better information about what EU 
governance is all about. Otherwise not only the EU, but 
also the member states may find themselves in a perpetual 
crisis of both problem-solving ability and democracy. 
Given the lengthy negotiation and ratification process for 
any Constitutional Treaty changes, the question here is 
therefore not what needs to be achieved in the long-term, 
but what could be concrete steps to reach out to EU citizens 
now and how to create incentives for a larger public to 
become engaged in an EU debate. The following proposals 
are aimed at four different groups of actors: EU institutions, 
national decision-makers, the media and academia. None of 
the proposed changes require extensive or lengthy 
ratification procedures. 
2. Communicating better: Some concrete 
proposals 
European Union institutions 
At first glance, the record low EU election turnout 
ironically comes at a time when awareness of 
communication issues is at a historic high in Brussels. After 
the resignation of the Commission presided over by 
Jacques Santer, a number of reforms were initiated in the 
EU’s public communication policy. A Press and 
Communication Directorate-General was created from the 
communication functions of the former DG-10 
(Information) and the press service, working directly under 
the authority of the Commission president. For the first 
time, the Commission united its capacity for public opinion 
and press analysis, information campaigns and day-to-day 
political communication under one roof. This new 
departure was underpinned by reforms of the staffing 
policy for the Commission’s top jobs, which strengthened 
lines of internal accountability and therefore also 
communication. In the meantime there has been much 
progress on what could be called ‘passive’ communication 
at the EU level: the availability of documents has been 
much improved and the Commission’s europa website is CAN THE EU COMMUNICATE BETTER? | 3 
 
now significantly more understandable and attractive for 
the general user than it was before. 
Nevertheless, the new presidential style of a united 
communication policy lacked a president capable of 
making the best use of it. Moreover, the Commission still 
has only very limited resources for communication and the 
fragmentation of communication among departments and 
commissioners with their own interests continues to be a 
problem. Two years ago the Commission published an 
information and communication strategy for the EU 
(European Commission, 2002a) in which it defined key 
problems and concrete solutions. Proposals aimed at 
strengthening cooperation with the European Parliament 
and, most notably, among member states in the 
communication of EU policies. The paper also 
demonstrated a realisation that communication about the 
EU is a long-term exercise, which stands no chance of 
success of reaching out to 450 million citizens without the 
full involvement of member states. Despite the wording of 
the communication to this effect, member states do not 
seem to take their political responsibilities in this area 
seriously. They are reluctant to agree to the envisaged 
memoranda of understanding and shy away from making 
financial commitments of a relevant size (see European 
Commission, 2004, p. 9). It is clear that the Commission 
alone cannot provide the answer to the EU’s 
communication problems, but it can do more to 
communicate better – acting as a catalyst to induce more 
thorough reform steps. Moreover, the EU should avoid a 
paternalistic approach when trying to inform and convince 
citizens. The EU is not a branded product, but aspires to be 
a democratic political enterprise that citizens may decide 
not to like, even if they are properly informed. Since this is 
not yet the case, however, EU institutions should consider 
the following actions: 
•  Promoting information and communication efforts 
that reach beyond the ‘usual suspects’. In its 
information and communication strategy the 
Commission has already acknowledged that “the 
temptation to be satisfied with maintaining dialogue 
with the natural circle of those already ‘in the know’” 
represents “a real challenge”. Unfortunately this 
awareness does not seem to have translated into better 
communication with those citizens who are apathetic or 
even afraid of European integration. The Commission is 
not always able to control whether programmes actually 
reach more than the ‘usual suspects’. Often the 
Commission seems to be too focused on the quantity of 
attendants, not checking who has actually been reached 
by the conferences and information campaigns that it 
supports. In order to free-up administrative resources 
and promote an evaluation culture, the Commission 
should aim to doing fewer things but at a higher 
standard, concentrating resources on key priorities and 
actions. A key priority for information campaigns, 
which ought to be developed in close cooperation with 
member state governments, could be explaining the 
Constitutional Treaty or the Lisbon Strategy through the 
news media, cinema and the internet. 
•  Decentralising and targeting communication. 
Information must be adapted to different social groups 
and national contexts. It is of key importance that 
people become more aware of what difference the EU 
makes to their individual lives and what means they can 
use to influence it. Consequently, information for retired 
people has to be different from that for families or 
school children. The respective information should be 
explained to local ‘multipliers’ who enjoy credibility 
among the target audience. Moreover, EU policies need 
to be communicated differently in the UK than in 
Germany, possibly by giving the Commission’s national 
representations more autonomy in choosing and 
administering EU support for information activities. In 
doing so, governments should be consulted, but should 
not have an effective veto on the focus and 
implementation of information activities. This may 
require upgrading the political profile of the heads of 
EU representations in the member states. 
•  Giving the EU a personal face and voice. Politics is 
transported through personalities, not press releases. In 
comparison to national parliamentarians or ministers, 
EU parliamentarians and commissioners spend less time 
communicating with their home-base than policy-
making. While inter-DG consultation procedures, 
committee participations and co-decisions are time-
consuming, both MEPs and commissioners should make 
more of an effort to communicate with the citizens of 
their constituencies as well as those of other countries. 
Too often MEPs complain when national party 
selections go against them or when they enter the 
campaign that their efforts in legislation are not really 
noted at home. They need to devise ways of selling their 
efforts to their nationally based media, not just the 
Brussels press. Similarly, more support and incentives 
are needed for commissioners to become more active 
communicators beyond Brussels. MEPs should attempt 
to monitor commissioners’ communication performance 
and criticise them if they develop a fortress-mentality. 
This could be combined with an informal bi-annual 
assessment of each commissioner, which would of 
course have no legal consequences but could damage 
the reputations of poorly performing commissioners. 
Political parties should also aim at enhancing MEPs’ 
communication skills through training, support and 
possibly a peer-review approach. 
•  Supporting new technologies and improving 
internet-based communication. EU institutions have 
embraced the internet as a cost-efficient way of making 
information available to large number of citizens. 
Moreover, the EU should look at ways of supporting 
online journalism with EU specialisation, which is on 
the rise. Nevertheless, giving access to the abundance of 
the material currently not available online could be as 
much of a problem as a solution, because it could lead 4 | Kurpas, Meyer & Gialoglou 
 
to confusion. Online content needs to be organised and 
adapted to meet the divergent demands of experts, 
journalists and citizens. Widening access to documents 
is important for one group of users, whereas others 
would benefit more from better information about rights 
within the single market and Q&A sections. Finally, the 
Commission should reinforce its support for the spread 
of broadband and wireless internet access, particularly 
by measures aimed at bringing down the costs through 
targeted competition policy. 
National and regional levels 
The Achilles heel of EU communication is the lack of 
involvement of national governments, who still regard 
Brussels as a useful scapegoat for things that go wrong yet 
a potential threat to the public profile of the national 
government as the main problem-solver. National ministers 
tend to keep a low profile on EU issues, so that they can 
claim success after a decision is announced, or can blame 
other countries or (more likely) the Commission for 
unfavourable outcomes. Member states usually have little 
interest in communicating the benefits of the EU in general 
or issues such as enlargement or the Convention in 
particular. If they do engage with these issues they do so 
only in cases of imminent referenda and by means of short-
term, top-down information campaigns. The 
communicative absence of member states in EU 
governance serves to preserve the public impression of the 
powerful nation-state, increasing their room for manoeuvre 
at the negotiation table, and more crucially, in the 
preparatory stages of decision-making. Hence, the 
avoidance of visible interpersonal political conflict before a 
decision is taken (upstream) has led to a lack of media 
attention downstream and to public mistrust for being 
confronted with faites accomplis. Through the recent rise of 
Eurosceptic parties, however, national politicians can see 
how this strategy has backfired, putting them under 
pressure to justify their EU policies and win highly 
contentious referenda. National actors could contribute to 
better communication through actions such as: 
•  Creating a peer-review process in communication. 
There may be a window of opportunity to involve 
member states in a more coordinated approach to 
informing citizens about the EU along the lines of the 
open method of coordination. Non-binding, multi-
annual guidelines for national information and 
communication could be developed, best practices and 
quantitative benchmarks could be identified and 
national action plans could be formulated, implemented 
and peer-reviewed. These guidelines should focus on 
the one hand on national administrations’ responsibility 
for informing citizens about the practical implications of 
EU legislation and how they can apply their rights. On 
the other hand, peer review should aim at generally 
increasing the levels of knowledge about the EU, how it 
works and what it does. When considering 
Eurobarometer data about how well informed citizens’ 
feel about the EU, it is quite clear that some countries 
are much better than others at informing their citizenry. 
Ranking countries according to these achievements may 
also give governments an argument for becoming more 
active in providing information despite domestic 
opposition. A long-term approach would also counteract 
the problem that EU information programmes have 
often been short-term and lacked a sustainable impact. 
Just when awareness and interest in a certain issue has 
been raised, the programme ends without further follow-
up.  
•  Targeting communal and regional opinion leaders. 
Government information efforts should seek to win 
responsible ‘multipliers’ in local institutions (schools, 
social clubs, political parties, churches, local 
newspapers, etc.) to act as instigators of open debate. It 
has to be ensured that they really have street credibility 
among those targeted. Multipliers must be provided 
with information materials and should be assisted with 
responding to feedback and questions that arise from 
debates.  
•  Targeting young people. If the next generation of EU 
citizens is to be adequately informed about the EU and 
can make best use of its opportunities, a range of 
measures should be considered by governments. 
Second-language education needs to be further 
enhanced, so that every citizen should be able to 
communicate in at least one second language. 
Moreover, national history, geography and politics 
curricula could be scrutinised as to whether these 
provide information about other European countries as 
well as about the EU. Governments should also aim at 
enhancing mobility and understanding of other countries 
by continuing their support for exchange schemes 
among schools. 
The media 
As the most important – and in many cases the only – link 
between decision-makers and citizens, the role of the media 
is of great importance. Being profit-oriented, however, 
national media often ignore EU politics, which they believe 
to be complicated and uninteresting for a wider audience 
and therefore unattractive to cover. Brussels journalists 
struggle, given the time/space constraints, to explain how 
and why the decisions about certain issues are relevant to 
their readers/audience. This problem has been reinforced by 
the lack of staff most media organisations have to cover EU 
politics. Despite a massive rise of accredited correspondent 
numbers in Brussels, many media organisations, especially 
from southern and Eastern Europe, do not have a 
correspondent in Brussels to properly investigate a given 
story or conflict. Moreover, in order to hold EU decision-
makers accountable for their actions, truly transnational 
investigations are needed in order to access information 
from officials and other potential whistle-blowers at various 
levels of EU governance. The lack of truly multinational 
media products or research cooperation means that the 
puzzle pieces of a story remain unconnected and public CAN THE EU COMMUNICATE BETTER? | 5 
 
scrutiny comes too late or fails to make a lasting impact 
across Brussels or national publics. Another problem is the 
lack of linkage between Brussels-based correspondents 
(who tend to be generalists) and the specialised reporters at 
the member state level. For Brussels-based correspondents 
it is often hard to assess the significance and likely impact 
of certain decisions and thus they fail to give them the 
visibility they deserve. The specialists at the national level, 
on the other hand, often do not understand the stages of EU 
decision-making or the roles of the different EU institutions 
and are thus more prone to misrepresent who has been 
responsible for what. They are also more likely to fall 
victim to national spin and prejudice, since they do not 
possess the contacts or means to countercheck national 
accounts of bargaining and its outcomes. Even under the 
current circumstances, however, media organisations could 
take some positive steps to improve citizens’ information 
and enhance cross-national debate, as outlined below. 
•  Editors should treat EU politics as a news item with 
domestic relevance. EU news items are still primarily 
found on the economics and foreign news pages, even 
though the frequency and spread of coverage across 
sections has increased. Even regional newspapers 
should look at cost-efficient ways of having a presence 
in Brussels, for instance by sharing offices and staff. 
But even more importantly, the goal should be to 
improve the communication among journalists working 
with national and EU news sources. This could be done 
through the institution of an EU-liaison news editor, 
who alerts other sections (sports, culture, economics, 
etc.) to the relevance of developments in Brussels or 
other national capitals. The cross-fertilisation of news 
gathering from different arenas of political action 
becomes ever more important for the adequate scrutiny 
of multi-level governance, and editorial offices should 
aim fostering and coordinating such a process. Brussels-
based correspondents should, for instance, investigate 
the EU dimension of national or regional concerns more 
closely, while domestic journalists should pay more 
attention to the potential repercussions of EU decisions. 
Such an approach would also help to address the 
accountability gap arising from ministers’ credit- and 
blame-shifting strategies across the different levels of 
EU governance.  
•  More collaboration and network-building among 
different national and regional news organisations 
and journalists is required. Many of the key issues in 
EU politics today cannot be properly investigated by 
relying on national sources alone. Yet journalists from 
one national context face a number of obstacles when 
researching and covering an issue touching on other 
member states or foreign news sources. News 
organisations should aim at fostering the evolution of 
transnational research networks to remedy these gaps by 
relying on the expertise and contacts of other 
organisations and journalists. Informal networks 
between journalists played a key role in investigating 
the news stories that led to the resignation of the Santer 
Commission (Meyer, 2002). Generally, media 
organisations should seek to improve their research 
collaboration and not only the exchange of news 
content, which could be highly institutionalised as in the 
case of the British and the German Financial Times or 
informal through non-profit, private journalists’ 
associations. 
•  Journalists need to be equipped with the knowledge 
and skills to cover EU politics. The EU is still an 
unknown entity for many journalists. They lack basic 
knowledge about EU decision-making and institutions, 
do not know where or how to find the relevant 
information quickly and are hampered by language 
difficulties. News organisations should aim at creating 
and training a workforce that is capable of doing 
research on EU issues. They should foster knowledge of 
foreign languages, stimulate the use of the internet as a 
major source of information on EU affairs and offer 
possibilities for journalists to go to Brussels for in-office 
training or take courses in EU news reporting. One 
could also envisage exchange, twinning and internship 
programmes among media organisations from different 
countries, which could help to improve the knowledge 
of other countries and build-up contacts, which are 
useful for foreign news research. Finally, steps need to 
be taken to improve the linkages between national 
journalists’ associations, which could cooperate for 
instance on developing a charter or a code of conduct 
for EU journalism or discuss the development of 
training programmes for journalists.  
Academic institutions: Universities, research 
centres and think-tanks 
Academic institutions are potential hubs for greater 
involvement by young people, the generation of ideas and 
the debate over proposed policies. They can effectively 
disseminate EU information to young citizens (e.g. through 
EU-related modules). Today the EU already spends large 
amounts of money on supporting EU-related research and 
teaching through Jean-Monnet Chairs, Erasmus and Marie-
Curie programmes and the 6th Framework Programme for 
Research and Technological Development (FP6). Despite 
these achievements, a better networking of national 
resources is still very much needed and only initial steps 
have been taken towards a more coherent approach in the 
sense of an EU research area. The issue here, however, is 
not so much the deepening of EU research, but the 
widening of EU audiences. In this direction academic 
institutions could take the following steps: 
•  Universities need to demonstrate the link between 
the national and the EU dimensions. Universities in 
particular can guarantee – through their independent 
character – that information and not propaganda is on 
offer. Their dual function of teaching and research 
production doubles their impact on communication 
about the EU to its citizens. In light of the above, 
universities need to update curricula and even redraft 6 | Kurpas, Meyer & Gialoglou 
 
essential textbooks so that students become aware of the 
EU dimension in their respective area of study. This 
may have a spillover effect on the importance of 
Community decision-making in all aspects of the public 
sphere. The pursuit of funding for the redrafting of 
textbooks and the training of academic teachers could 
be considered. 
•  Research centres and think-tanks should (also) 
target a wider audience. Research centres and think-
tanks have a more difficult role, given their nature of 
producing specialised and ad hoc materials that tend to 
address a very specific audience. Yet, perhaps therein 
lies the answer, and they ought to consider ways of 
increasing the appeal of research and policy documents 
to reach non-expert audiences as well. Their success 
will depend on improved communication, language and 
presentation skills. Simplified vocabulary, an 
introductory chapter to set the scene with a focus on the 
EU dimension for non-expert readers, standardised 
Q&A sections on websites and reaching out to local and 
regional communities are potential remedies as 
previously mentioned. The meeting of such standards as 
criteria for funding would lead towards the expansion of 
the circles involved, thus progressively engaging the 
‘indifferent’. Such a pro-active approach is eventually 
both necessary and beneficial for research centres and 
think-tanks since it increases their legitimacy and 
awareness of their functions. 
3. Conclusion 
Clearly, the proposals sketched above are not a quick-fix 
solution nor are they meant to be comprehensive. They are 
rather a pragmatic illustration of what may be possible. 
Indeed, some of the communication problems are the result 
of a deeply ingrained technocratic mode of governance that 
needs more than the current Constitutional Treaty to change 
for good. Accountability and democracy hurt, otherwise 
they do not work. But are the member states really prepared 
to pay the price of democracy and change their passive or 
even hostile attitude to EU-related communication? The 
challenge is enormous. The potential for intra-EU conflict 
is likely to rise in the future, possibly manifesting itself in 
controversies about the ratification of the Constitutional 
Treaty, the EU’s economic prospects or the accession of 
Turkey. Public communication is one of the few means to 
mediate between different national interests and 
perspectives and can help avoid the risks of polarisation 
through ignorance about the EU and other member states.  
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